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Abstract
This paper explores a unique equilibrium model of informational
Þnancial contagion. Extending the global game model of Morris and
Shin (1999), I show that the failure of a single Þrm can trigger a chain
of failures merely by affecting the behavior of investors. In contrast to
the existing multiple equilibria models of Þnancial and banking pan-
ics, there is no indeterminacy in the present model. Thus, it provides
a clear framework to assess the consequences of contagion and yields
some important and hitherto unnoticed insights. Most importantly, if
contagion is compared to an appropriate benchmark, its impact can be
both positive or negative, which contrasts sharply with the traditional
view of contagion. Moreover, contagion increases the correlation be-
tween Þrms, but the effect on the unconditional probability of failure
is exactly zero.
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1 Introduction
As is well known in the growing literature on Þnancial contagion and sys-
temic risk, there are at least two potential channels through which a single
Þrm can affect other Þrms. The Þrst channel rests upon on direct capital
connections between the Þrms, which make it possible that the failure of a
debtor leads to the failure of its creditors simply because the latter have to
write off their claims. While it is difficult to get an accurate picture of these
credit linkages in practice, the mechanism of this transmission channel seems
to be well understood. Recent theoretical models which deal with such con-
tagion in a banking framework include Rochet and Tirole (1996), Allen and
Gale (2000) and Dasgupta (2001). A second channel, which I will refer to as
informational contagion, hinges on the beliefs of Þnancial market partici-
pants. In a banking context, depositors (or also other banks) may decide to
withdraw their claims when observing the collapse of another bank because
they lack precise information on how the failure is related to their own bank.
Likewise, international investors might withdraw their investments from a
country when they observe trouble in a different country, and due to such
reactions of investors, a crisis can spread from one Þrm or country to others.
Since the present paper focuses on this second channel, I will refer to infor-
mational contagion whenever I speak of (Þnancial) contagion hereafter.1 ,2
Although informational contagion is widely believed in3 and is a major
concern behind regulatory measures such as introducing a deposit insurance,
providing implicit government guarantees or imposing capital controls, there
are few formal models which deal with the informational propagation channel.
Recent exceptions include Chen (1999) and Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont
(2000). Obviously, a major impediment to a sound theoretical foundation of
informational contagion is the presence of multiple equilibria in the usual
1Typically, contagion is either discussed in a banking or in an international crises
context, so I will also have these examples in mind, although my model is rather general.
Since the literature is far from converging to a common deÞnition of the widely used terms
contagion and systemic risk, I renounce to give a precise deÞnition until section 4.
2For a discussion of different bank contagion channels, see Kaufman (1994). Dornbusch
et al. (2000) survey international contagion channels.
3See e.g. Park (1991), who argues that the lack of bankspeciÞc information is the
main source of bank contagion and offers evidence in favour of this view. Calomiris and
Mason (1997), and Gorton (1988) also Þnd evidence of informational bank contagion. For
evidence on informational contagion across countries, see Ahluwalia (2000), Park and Song
(2000), and also Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996).
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coordination failure and bank run models as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
Since the events which determine the beliefs of the depositors and may trigger
a run are not part of these models, it remains open which equilibrium will
occur. Hence, there is an apparent indeterminacy in any sunspot model. If
theory offers little guidance on the circumstances which trigger a single bank
run, it seems even less suited to predict in which situations contagion will
occur. Put differently, if a model predicts that depending on the agents
beliefs, any outcome of Þrm A can be an equilibrium, but remains completely
silent about the beliefs, it is hardly able to predict if and how the outcome
of Þrm A could affect a different Þrm B. The same problems arise in models
of international Þnancial crises with self-fulÞlling features in the manner of
Obstfeld (1996).
There is, however, a recent strand of literature, initiated by Carlsson and
van Damme (1993) and further advanced by Morris and Shin (1998) in a
speculative attack framework, which has developed a technique that selects
a unique equilibrium in many coordination failure models.4 The common
feature of this global games approach is that the payoffs of the players
depend on some random state of the world, which is however not common
knowledge. Instead, each player privately observes a noisy signal of the
true state. Interestingly, this assumption is not only a step towards a more
realistic information structure, but also introduces a useful structure into the
beliefs of agents which leads a unique equilibrium. In another contribution,
Morris and Shin (1999) provide a model of a coordination failure among
numerous small creditors Þnancing a common project. They show that in the
presence of noisy but sufficiently precise private information of the creditors,
there is a unique threshold of the realization of some fundamental variable
below which the borrower is run or denied sufficient credit such that the
project fails. Although systemic risk is neither an issue in Morris and Shin
(1999) nor in any other model with only one Þrm, there is little doubt that
Carlsson and van Dammes (1993) unique equilibrium selection technique
provides a promising framework to analyze contagion.
In this paper, I therefore extend a modiÞed version of the Morris and Shin
(1999) model to include two (or more) Þrms and two (kinds of) fundamental
4A precursor of this literature is Rubinstein (1989). Morris and Shin (2001) provide
a good survey of this global games approach. Goldstein and Pauzner (2000) apply the
technique to the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. Rochet and Vives (2000) also explore
a banking model. Finally, it shall be mentioned that an earlier bank model with a unique
Bayesian equilibrium is found in Postlewaite and Vives (1987).
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variables. The Þrst fundamental represents states which are speciÞc for each
Þrm, while the second fundamental is a common state inßuencing all Þrms
within an industry or region. Further, I introduce a time structure such
that the investors of the second Þrm can observe what happens to the Þrst
project before deciding whether to roll over their loans. In this model, there
is still a unique equilibrium in which each Þrm succeeds if and only if the Þrm
speciÞc fundamental exceeds some threshold, which depends on the state of
the common fundamental. In addition, it can be shown that the equilibrium
threshold of the second Þrm is larger when the Þrst Þrm fails, which implies
that a failure of the Þrst Þrm increases the probability that the second Þrm
fails. Hence, there is a contagious link between both projects which stems
from a purely informational channel. If the creditors of the second Þrm
observe that the Þrst Þrm fails, they adjust their prior beliefs on the state of
the common fundamental accordingly. As a consequence, they become more
reluctant to roll over their loans, which in turn may cause the collapse of the
second Þrm. On the other hand, by the same mechanism, a good result of the
Þrst Þrm can rescue the other, which is a positive aspect of contagion which
- as far as I know - has received no attention in the literature so far. Finally,
the outcome of the model can be compared to a natural benchmark in which
there is no contagion. As an important result, if we are only concerned about
the unconditional likelihood of failure of the Þrms, the net effect of contagion
is exactly zero. This result emerges despite the fact that a failure of the
Þrst Þrm can trigger the failure of the second Þrm (and possibly more Þrms).
Therefore, the model provides not only a rigorous theoretical foundation of
an informational channel of contagion, but also reveals that the implications
of such contagion are quite different from those which the traditional view of
contagion suggests.
The present work is probably most closely related to the recent contri-
butions of Dasgupta (2001) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2001), which both
analyze the issue of contagion in a global game framework. However, the
propagation mechanisms in their models are different. Dasgupta (2001) de-
velops a banking model in which contagion stems from the existence of capital
links between Þnancial institutions. Goldstein and Pauzner (2001) explore
a model with two countries subject to self-fulÞlling Þnancial crises, in which
contagion emerges due to wealth effects. In their framework, a crisis in one
country reduces investors wealth, which makes them more risk averse and
more inclined to withdraw their investments from the second country. This
in turn raises the likelihood of a crisis in the second country. The model pre-
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sented in this paper, by contrast, presumes neither capital links nor wealth
effects. To my knowledge, it is the Þrst model of informational contagion in
a global game framework. Since the considered Þrms need not be banks, the
model is rather general, though banks seem to be typical examples of bor-
rowers facing numerous small creditors. If the different Þrms are interpreted
as representative Þrms of different countries, the model can also be applied
in an international setting to explore why and how different countries are
affected when one country experiences a Þnancial crisis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I present
the basic structure of the model and derive the unique equilibrium of the
game. For presentation purposes, the model is introduced with only one
Þrm, while the second Þrm is introduced in the extended model presented in
section 3. This part of the paper also contains the important result that there
is a contagious link between the Þrms. In section 4, I discuss the meaning and
the consequences of Þnancial contagion in some more detail and deÞne the
concepts of negative and positive contagion, while section 5 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 Structure of the Model with one Firm
To begin with and for ease of exposition, suppose there is only one Þrm,
which runs a project that is Þnanced by a continuum of creditors normalized
to one.5 In section 3, I will extend the model to include two or more Þrms,
which is of course a crucial step for the analysis of contagion. The basic
structure of the model and many features of the equilibrium, however, can
well be discussed in the framework with one Þrm. The model focuses on
the behavior of the individual creditors, who, ad an ad interim stage of the
project, receive the opportunity to rethink their investment and to decide on
whether to roll over their loans. The initial lending decision is not part of
the model, yet assume that the loan conditions are such that it is ex ante
rational to lend. Together with the realizations of two economic fundamental
variables, the fraction l of creditors who decide to withdraw their loans in
the intermediate period determines whether the Þrm succeeds or fails. At a
Þnal stage, the project is terminated and yields a gross return of R ≥ 1 if it
5The project represents the whole and only activity of the Þrm, hence I will use the
terms Þrm and project interchangeably.
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succeeds, whereas the return is 0 if it fails.6
The return r(θ, u, l) of the project is speciÞed as
r(θ, u, l) =
(
R if θ > u+ zl
0 if θ ≤ u+ zl , (1)
where θ and u index the states of two independent economic fundamentals.
More speciÞcally, assume that the state θ is drawn according to a uniform
distribution on the unit interval, while the state u is either u1 or u2 with
probabilities P (u = u1) = wa and P (u = u2) = 1 − wa, where u1 > u2.
Notice from (1) that strong economic fundamentals are associated with a
high θ and a low u. Of course, as long as only one project is considered, it
seems unnecessarily complicated to introduce two fundamentals. However,
the role of the second fundamental u will become clear in the model with two
Þrms in section 3, where I will assume that the state u equally affects both
Þrms, while θ is related to a speciÞc Þrm. That is, θ summarizes factors that
affect only one Þrm and could for example represent the ex ante unknown
quality of the hired chief manager, whereas u could be a proxy variable for
the demand facing the products of both Þrms.
The parameter z > 0 in equation (1) captures the disruption caused by
early loan withdrawals, which can be due to the Þrm having to sell illiquid
long-term assets at a Þre-sale loss in order to pay out the lenders. The higher
z, the more harm is caused by withdrawing funds before the project matures.
Further, assume that
u2 > 0, u1 + z < 1, (2)
which implies that the Þrm speciÞc fundamental θ is in some sense dominant,
because a sufficiently high (low) state θ can always save (ruin) the project.
Technically, assumption (2) guarantees the existence of a lower and an upper
dominance region of θ for which agents have dominant actions. There is
now a tripartite classiÞcation of the fundamental variables. If the state of
fundamentals turns out to be very poor, i.e. if θ ≤ u, the project fails even
under the best Þnancing conditions where nobody withdraws funds at the
intermediate state. Conversely, if θ > u+z, the project succeeds irrespective
6The date of termination may well depend on whether the project succeeds. In many
cases, including all kinds of runs, it seems plausible to assume that the project must be
abandoned immediately after the intermediate period if it is a failure, while otherwise, it
can be orderly terminated at its time of maturity.
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of the actions of the creditors, whereas if u < θ ≤ u+ z, the outcome of the
project depends in a crucial way on the actions of the creditors.
Creditors have Von Neumann - Morgenstern preferences and are risk neu-
tral. Hence, they maximize expected payoffs. If rolling over the loan, they
receive the face value of debt normalized to 1 if the projects succeeds and
nothing otherwise. If they withdraw early, they obtain some amount λ with
certainty, where 0 < λ < 1. One interpretation of this payoff structure is that
lenders can liquidate a collateral which yields λ in the intermediate period
but becomes worthless if the project fails. Alternatively, the difference 1− λ
may represent an interest rate which is paid to patient lenders, provided the
project succeeds. The payoffs of the creditors can be summarized as follows:
θ ≤ u+ lz θ > u+ lz
Roll over 0 1
Withdraw λ λ
It is important to see that if the states of θ and u were common knowledge,
the model would result in multiple equilibria whenever u ≤ θ < u + z . In
this case, if everyone rolls over the loan, no single agent has an incentive
to deviate given the others strategies, since the project succeeds anyway.
On the other hand, if nobody rolls over, nobody has an incentive to deviate
either, because the project certainly fails. Therefore, even if one neglects
mixed strategies, there are at least two obvious Nash equilibria. However,
these conclusions change considerably if we put the game in a global game
framework with incomplete information.
Assume, therefore, that the distributions of the fundamental variables are
common knowledge, but the true state of the fundamentals is not observable.
Instead, before deciding whether to roll over the loan, each creditor i privately
observes a noisy signal
si = θ + εi (3)
on the state θ, where εi is uniformly distributed on [−ε, ε] and independent
of θ and εk ∀k 6= i. Assume further that
2ε ≤ min[u2, 1− u1 − z], (4)
which means that the signal is at least of some minimal precision. One
natural interpretation of this framework with noisy signals is that investors
have access to different sources of information. Alternatively, they might
slightly differ by their interpretation of publicly available information.
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Finally, an important assumption of the model is that the creditors can-
not coordinate their behavior, i.e. they cannot meet to share their private
information - in which case they could learn θ by a law of large numbers - or
to coordinate their action before deciding on their credit. This assumption
is certainly plausible for depositors of a bank or other small and dispersed
investors. Thus, the decision whether to withdraw funds or not is the result
of a noncooperative game among the creditors. Moreover, since the type of
each player, which is characterized by the signal si, is private knowledge, it
is a game of incomplete information. In the next section, I show that this
game has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Unique Equilibrium
Creditors maximize expected payoffs. Hence, they roll over their loan if and
only if the expected payoff from doing so exceeds the opportunity costs λ.7
The only available information upon which this decision can be conditioned is
the signal si, so a strategy of a creditor is a plan which maps each signal si into
one of the two actions withdraw respectively roll over. In an equilibrium
proÞle of strategies, each creditors strategy maximizes her expected payment
given that the other creditors follow the strategies in the proÞle.
Before turning to the main results of this section, consider some prelim-
inaries. Since the error term εi of the signal is drawn from a uniform distri-
bution, the posterior belief θ | si of creditor i is also uniformly distributed,
that is:
θ | si u∼ [si − ε, si + ε]. (5)
More precisely, this is only true if ε ≤ si ≤ 1−ε, but given the assumption in
(4), the optimal response to any signal below ε or above 1−ε is trivial anyway.
To see this, note that any creditor who observes a signal si < s = u2 − ε
knows that θ < u2, which implies that the project fails even in the best case
where u = u2 and l = 0. Hence, the payoff from rolling over the loan is
zero with certainty, and the lender will withdraw her loan. Conversely, any
signal si > s = u1 + z + ε implies θ > u1 + z, such that the project succeeds
even in the worst case where u = u1 and l = 1, and so the loan is certainly
not withdrawn. To summarize, any rational creditor withdraws if observing
a signal si < s and rolls over whenever si > s. Hence, from here on, I will
7Where it is implicitly assumed that they terminate the loan if the expected payoff
from both actions is exactly equal. This assumption is not crucial for any results.
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restrict attention to signals in the interval [s, s] . Since the assumption in (4)
guarantees that s ≥ ε and s ≤ 1− ε, the distribution given in (5) is correct
for all relevant si ∈ [s, s] .
What is now the optimal strategy of a creditor who receives a signal
between s and s? Notice that the role of the signal is twofold. First, the
signal contains (possibly very precise) information on the state θ. Second
and perhaps more importantly, the signal is known to be correlated with the
private signals of others, which allows an inference regarding their beliefs
and actions. Unlike in a setup where θ is common knowledge, it is no longer
the case that any beliefs about the beliefs of others are equally permissible.
The signal structure, therefore, serves as a device to coordinate the (higher
order) beliefs of agents. It is exactly this role of the signal, together with the
existence of dominance regions ensured by assumption (2) and the strategic
complementarity proved in appendix 1, which leads to a unique equilibrium of
the game. Intuitively, observing a high signal is good news for each creditor,
because it means that the state θ is good. Since observing a high signal also
implies that the others have observed a high signal (and that all believe that
all have observed a high signal, and so on), it makes each creditor believe that
the other lenders are more inclined to roll over their loans. This is again good
news and increases the incentives to roll over the loan even further. Hence,
one might conjecture that there is some threshold s of the signal above which
the loan is rolled over. In the remainder of this section, I will show that this
guess turns out to be exactly true and that the following result holds:
Proposition 1 The game among creditors has a unique equilibrium in which
there is a threshold θ∗(u) of θ, depending on the state u of the other funda-
mental, such that the Þrm succeeds if and only if θ > θ∗(u).
The proposition can be proved in two main steps which are stated in
lemma 1 and 2. To begin with, suppose that all lenders follow a switching
or monotone strategy around some threshold parameter s. Thus, depending
on the observed signal si, each creditor i takes either action 0 (withdraw) or
1 (roll over). The switching strategy around s can be formalized as:
Is(si) =
(
0 if si ≤ s
1 if si > s
.
Further, denote by Q(s, Is) the expected payoff from rolling over the loan of
a creditor who observes the signal si = s and believes that all other creditors
follow strategy Is. We can then derive the following result:
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Lemma 1 If all creditors follow a switching strategy around some threshold
s, there is a unique value of s which solves Q(s, Is) = λ.
In order to prove lemma 1, it is sufficient to establish that Q(s, Is) raises
from 0 to 1 and is strictly increasing in s over the whole range [s, s]. This
is what I now show. If every lender applies the switching strategy Is, the
proportion of creditors terminating the loan in the intermediate period con-
ditional on s and θ is
l (s, θ) = P (si ≤ s | θ) =
Z min[s,θ+ε,]
min[θ−ε,s]
(2ε)−1dsi
respectively
l (s, θ) =

0 if s < θ − ε
1
2ε
[s− (θ − ε)] if θ − ε ≤ s ≤ θ + ε
1 if s > θ + ε
(6)
For both realizations u ∈ {u1, u2} , there is a unique critical value of θ, solving
θ = u+ zl (s, θ) ,
above which the project succeeds. Given equation (6) and conditional on
u ∈ {u1, u2}, this threshold of θ solves
θ =

u if s < θ − ε
u+ z
2ε
[s− (θ − ε)] if θ − ε ≤ s ≤ θ + ε
u+ z if s > θ + ε.
(7)
Let θcrit(s, u) denote this critical threshold of θ, conditional on s and on
u ∈ {u1, u2} . Hence, solving (7) for θ, θcrit(s, u) is determined as
θcrit(s, u) =

u if s < u− ε
2εu+z(s+ε)
2ε+z
if u− ε ≤ s ≤ u+ z + ε
u+ z if s > u+ z + ε
(8)
Of course, if the state u were known, no s below u − ε or above u + z + ε
could ever be an optimal switching threshold, but the creditors must Þnd their
optimal strategy without knowing u. Conditional on u ∈ {u1, u2} , and given
10
the posterior distribution of θ deÞned in (5), the expected payoff eQ(s, Is, u)
from rolling over the loan is
eQ(s, Is, u) = P (θ ≥ θcrit(s, u) | si = s) = Z max[s+ε,θcrit(s,u)]
max[s−ε,θcrit(s,u)]
(2ε)−1dθ.
From equation (8), Q(s, Is, u) can then be computed as
eQ(s, Is, u) =

0 if s < u− ε
1
2ε+z
[s+ ε− u] if u− ε ≤ s ≤ u+ z + ε
1 if s > u+ z + ε
(9)
Given eQ(s, Is, u) for both states u ∈ {u1, u2}, it is straightforward to compute
Q(s, Is). To keep the notation general enough for later purposes, I denote in
the following by w the probability that u is u1, conditional on all available
information. Of course, in the model with one Þrm, w is simply the uncon-
ditional probability wa, but in section 3, w will depend on some additional
information of the creditors. Since the best guess of P (u = u1) is given by w,
the unconditional expected payoff Q(s, Is) of the marginal creditor is then
Q(s, Is) = w eQ(s, Is, u1) + (1− w) eQ(s, Is, u2).
Together with equation (9), this gives us an expression for Q(s, Is) in terms
of the model parameters. Notice that Q(s, Is) = 0 for all s < s = u2 − ε
and that Q(s, Is) = 1 for all s > s = u1 + z + ε. Furthermore, as long as
s < u1 − ε, eQ(s, Is, u1) is zero, and for all s > u2 + z + ε, eQ(s, Is, u2) is one.
Therefore, assuming u1 − ε ≤ u2 + z + ε,8 the range [s, s] can be split into
three parts, and the expected payoff from rolling over the loan is:
Q(s, Is) =

(1−w)[s+ε−u2]
2ε+z
if s ≤ s < u1 − ε
s+ε−[wu1+(1−w)u2]
2ε+z
if u1 − ε ≤ s ≤ u2 + z + ε
w[s+ε−u1]
2ε+z
+ (1− w) if u2 + z + ε ≤ s ≤ s.
(10)
Figure (1) plots the graph of Q(s, Is), which is characterized by three linear
intercepts with different slopes, for an arbitrary parameter setting. Although
8This assumption ensures that the intermediate range is at least of measure zero. Oth-
erwise, if u1−ε > u2+z+ε, there would be a range in which Q(s, Is) is 1−w and we would
have to assume λ does not take the particular value 1−w to guarantee the uniqueness of
the equilibrium.
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the slope changes twice, Q(s, Is) is continuous in s over the whole range [s, s]
and the derivative with respect to s is
∂Q(s, Is)
∂s
=

1−w
2ε+z
if s < s < u1 − ε
1
2ε+z
if u1 − ε < s < u2 + z + ε
w
2ε+z
if u2 + z + ε < s < s
Clearly, this derivative is strictly positive.9 Thus Q(s, Is) runs from 0 to 1
and is monotonically increasing in s ∀ s ∈ [s, s], which implies that for each
λ, there is exactly one value of s which solves Q(s, Is) = λ, as is illustrated
in Þgure (1). This proves lemma 1.
Figure 1: Threshold s∗ for (u1, u2, z, ε,λ, wa)=(0.4,0.2,0.5,0.05,0.3,0.5)
So far, I have restricted attention to pure switching strategies in which
creditors roll over their loan if and only if the signal exceeds some threshold,
though in principal they might also follow mixed strategies, presumably giv-
ing more weight to the action roll over if the signal si increases.10 However,
9The fact that the derivative is not deÞned if s is either s, u1 − ε, u2 + z + ε or s does
not change the conclusion that Q(s, Is) is strictly increasing in s in the range [s, s].
10Some authors restrict attention to such switching strategies from the beginning. See
for instance Dasgupta (2001) and Rochet and Vives (2000).
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the following lemma states that the unique equilibrium strategy of the game
is indeed a pure switching strategy around the threshold s∗.
Lemma 2 If there is a unique value s∗ of s solving Q(s, Is) = λ, there is a
unique equilibrium of the game in which every creditor rolls over the loan if
and only if the signal exceeds the threshold s∗.
There are several ways to prove this threshold structure of the unique
equilibrium, which is now familiar in the global games literature. The proof
presented in appendix A follows Morris and Shin (1998). The crucial step
of this (or any other) proof is to show that the decisions to roll over the
loan are strategic complements, which, together with lemma 1, implies the
result of lemma 2. Hence, lemma 1 and 2 together establish that there is
a unique switching threshold s∗ and that the unique equilibrium strategy is
Is∗(si). This in turn implies, together with equation (8), that there is a unique
equilibrium threshold θ∗(u) ≡ θcrit(s∗, u) for each state u ∈ {u1, u2} such that
the project succeeds if and only if θ > θ∗(u). This proves proposition 1. Since
the discrete threshold function θ∗(u) takes only two different values, I will also
use the notation θ∗(u1) = θ∗1 and θ
∗(u2) = θ∗2. Note that while the threshold
θ∗(u) depends on u, the strategy parameter s∗ does not, for u is unknown at
the time when the decision whether to roll over the loan is taken.
2.3 Equilibrium Thresholds
Given the unique equilibrium proÞle of strategies, we can solve the model for
the equilibrium thresholds s∗, θ∗1 and θ
∗
2. First, Q(s
∗, Is∗) = λ can be solved
to obtain the equilibrium switching threshold s∗. Notice that in order to solve
Q(s∗, Is∗) = λ for s∗, either the Þrst, second or third line of equation (10)
has to be used, depending on the particular value of λ. In a second step, s∗
and equation (8) determine the two equilibrium thresholds θ∗1 and θ
∗
2, where
one has to bear in mind that θ∗1 is simply u1 as soon as s
∗ < u1 − ε and that
θ∗2 = u2 + z if s
∗ > u2 + z+ ε. Summarizing the results, the model yields the
following equilibrium thresholds
s∗ =

u2 + λ
2ε+z
1−w − ε if 0 < λ < λ
wu1 + (1− w)u2 + λ (2ε+ z)− ε if λ ≤ λ ≤ λ
u1 +
(λ+w−1)(2ε+z)
w
− ε if λ < λ < 1
13
θ∗1 =

u1 if 0 < λ < λ
2εu1+zu2+zw(u1−u2)
2ε+z
+ λz if λ ≤ λ ≤ λ
u1 + z
³
1− 1−λ
w
´
if λ < λ < 1
(11)
θ∗2 =

u2 +
λz
1−w if 0 < λ < λ
u2 +
zw(u1−u2)
2ε+z
+ λz if λ ≤ λ ≤ λ
u2 + z if λ < λ < 1
,
where the different ranges of λ are separated by
λ =
(1− w) [u1 − u2]
2ε+ z
and λ = 1− w(u1 − u2)
2ε+ z
. (12)
It is important to stress that although the fundamentals uniquely de-
termine whether the project succeeds, the outcome is still driven by the
expectations of the agents. In many cases, creditors withdraw their loans
only because they believe that others are going to do so, and since the other
creditors share the same fear, a collapse of the Þrm can be the result of self-
fulÞlling beliefs. If for example u1 + 2ε < θ < θ
∗(u), which may well be the
case if λ or z is large enough, the Þrm fails although everyone knows that
this is not justiÞed by the fundamentals.11 Only for extreme values of θ that
lead to signals below s or above s for which agents have dominant actions,
there is no need to care about other players beliefs. Therefore, the point I
want to make is that the crucial role of the fundamental is not to exclude
self-fulÞlling failures. Rather, given the assumed information structure, it
uniquely determines the beliefs of the agents and thereby their behavior.
Another lesson of the preceding analysis is that the outcome of the model
is not efficient, for if the creditors could coordinate their actions, they would
agree to roll over their loans for more states of the economic fundamentals,
thereby lowering the thresholds and the likelihood of a failure. In the Þrst
best outcome, everyone would roll over her loan if and only if θ > u, which
would require both coordination and the knowledge of u. As a weaker conclu-
sion, even if u is unknown, there is no doubt that any fundamental threshold
above u1 is inefficient.
11At the risk of raising confusion, one may even emphasize the subtle but essential role
of higher order beliefs. A player may be reluctant to roll over even if she knows that θ > u1
and that everyone knows that θ > u1, for she may not know that everyone knows that
everyone knows that θ > u1, which is in fact never common knowledge in this game. See
Morris and Shin (1998), (2001) for more on higher order beliefs in global games.
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In the remainder of this section, I discuss some properties of the thresholds
θ∗1 and θ
∗
2, which in turn determine the likelihood of failure of the project.
A Þrst important result which follows easily from the thresholds in (11) and
from u1 > u2 is that
θ∗1 > θ
∗
2, (13)
which simply means that the threshold above which the projects succeeds is
higher in the worse case u = u1. Second, differentiating the thresholds with
respect to the model parameters z and λ yields
∂θ∗(u)
∂z
≥ 0 and ∂θ
∗(u)
∂λ
≥ 0. (14)
In economic terms, an increasing disruption z caused by early loan termi-
nations raises ceteris paribus the critical threshold above which the Þrm
survives. Also consistent with intuition, a growing λ, implying higher oppor-
tunity costs of lending, increases the thresholds, since it makes the lenders
more inclined to withdraw their funds before the project matures, which in
term lowers the likelihood of success. The dispersion ε of the signal si, on
the other hand, has no clear impact on the thresholds. More precisely,
∂θ∗1
∂ε
≥ 0 and ∂θ
∗
2
∂ε
≤ 0. (15)
Thus, an increasing ε drives the two thresholds apart, if it has any inßuence
at all. In order to analyze how u1 and u2 affect the thresholds, it seems
useful to deÞne the numbers u and k such that u1 = u + k and u2 = u− k.
Differentiating the thresholds yields then
∂θ∗(u)
∂u
= 1, (16)
whereas the sign of the derivative with respect to k is ambiguous. There is
again an intuitive interpretation of the result in (16). Raising the average u
of u1 and u2 corresponds to an adverse shift in the distribution of u, which
is equivalent to a downward shift of the distribution of the Þrm speciÞc
variable θ. Due to the assumed uniform distribution of θ, such a shift raises
the thresholds by the same amount.
Finally, it is important to see that both thresholds θ∗1and θ
∗
2 satisfy
∂θ∗(u)
∂w
≥ 0. (17)
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Note that although θ∗1 = u1 or θ
∗
2 = u2 + z for some values of λ, at least one
of the two thresholds θ∗1 and θ
∗
2 is always strictly increasing in w. In other
words, if the creditors attach a higher probability to the undesirable state
u = u1, the project is more likely to fail.
With these results in mind, we are now ready to incorporate a second
Þrm into the model and to explore the main implications of this extension.
3 The Model with 2 Firms
3.1 The Time Structure of the Model
In this part of the paper, I extend the model to include a second Þrm. Thus,
suppose there are two basically identical Þrms A and B both of which run
a project Þnanced by two separate continua of creditors. Assume further
that the state u is the same for both Þrms, while there are two independent
Þrm speciÞc states θA and θB. The latter can be interpreted either as two
independent draws from one uniformly distributed fundamental variable or
as the joint realization of two independent uniform random variables. The
return of each Þrm is still given by equation (1), except that for Þrm A (Þrm
B), θ is replaced by θA (θB).
In addition, I assume the following time structure, which is summarized in
Þgure (2). In a Þrst stage, both Þrms start their projects, and nature chooses
the states u, θA and θB according to the underlying probability distributions.
In a second stage, each creditor of Þrm A receives a signal on θA as speciÞed
in (3) and individually decides whether to withdraw her loan. Subsequently,
the project of Þrm Amatures and everyone, including the creditors of Þrm B,
observes whether Þrm A fails or not. However, neither u nor θA is observed
by anyone at this time. The agents may learn these realizations after the
termination of project B or even never, where the latter seems more plausible.
Having observed the outcome of A, the creditors of Þrm B receive a signal
on θB and decide whether to withdraw their loans.12 Finally, the project of
Þrm B is completed.
Since the creditors of A have no additional information beyond the signal
si when deciding on their loan, they behave like the creditors in the model
12They may also observe the signal earlier, e.g. together with the creditors of Þrm A.
The crucial point is that the creditors of Þrm B can wait longer until they have to decide
whether they roll over their loans.
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Figure 2: Timing of Events
with one Þrm, and the equilibrium results of the previous sections go through
unchanged. The creditors of the second Þrm, however, can observe the out-
come of the Þrst Þrm. Does this observation provide useful information which
affects the behavior of the creditors? Clearly, the answer is yes, as is shown
in the next subsection.
3.2 Updating the Beliefs
To see what information can be gained from observing the outcome of A,
consider Þrst what happens to Þrm A. Since the Þrst Þrm is equivalent to the
single Þrm in the model of section 2, except that the fundamental θ is replaced
by θA, we know that there is a unique equilibrium in which the creditors of A
roll over their loans if and only if their signal exceeds some critical level s∗A,
so that Þrm A succeeds if and only if θA exceeds some threshold θ
∗
A(u). The
thresholds of the signal and of θA are still given by the terms in (11), where
w is the unconditional probability w = P (u = u1) = wa. In the following, I
deÞne by θ∗A,1 and θ
∗
A,2 the two thresholds θ
∗
1 and θ
∗
2 computed with w = w
a,
which can be summarized in the discrete threshold function θ∗A(u) given by
θ∗(u) with w = wa. Further, let FA denote the event where Þrm A fails
and SA ≡ FA be the complementary event where A survives. In equilibrium,
Þrm A fails whenever θA ≤ θ∗A(u). Thus, the formal deÞnitions of the events
failure of A and success of A are:
FA = {{θA, u} | θA ≤ θ∗A(u)}
SA = {{θA, u} | θA > θ∗A(u)} .
Since θ is uniformly distributed over the unit interval, the probability that
the realization of θ does not exceed a speciÞc threshold is equivalent to the
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threshold itself, so it is straightforward to compute the following conditional
probabilities:
P (FA | u = u1) = θ∗A,1
P (FA | u = u2) = θ∗A,2
P (SA | u = u1) = 1− θ∗A,1
P (SA | u = u2) = 1− θ∗A,2 .
(18)
In a next step, let wf ≡ P (u = u1 | FA) denote the probability that u is
u1, conditional on the failure of A, while ws ≡ P (u = u1 | SA) shall denote
the corresponding probability conditional on a success of A. It can then be
shown that ws < wa < wf , which is an important result for what follows
later. To prove this claim, notice that by Bayes rule, the probability of u
being u1 conditional on FA can be computed as:
wf =
P (FA | u = u1)P (u = u1)
P (FA | u = u1)P (u = u1) + P (FA | u = u2)P (u = u2) .
Together with P (u = u1) = wa and P (u = u2) = 1 − wa, equation (18)
provides all probabilities that are needed to compute wf . Proceeding the
same way, we can also compute the probability ws. The results in terms of
the fundamental thresholds are:
wf =
waθ∗A,1
waθ∗A,1 + (1− wa)θ∗A,2
(19)
ws =
wa(1− θ∗A,1)
1− waθ∗A,1 − (1− wa)θ∗A,2
. (20)
Finally, notice from inequality (13) in section 2.3 that θ∗A,1 > θ
∗
A,2, which
implies
θ∗A,1 > w
aθ∗A,1 + (1− wa)θ∗A,2
and, after multiplying both sides by w
a
waθ∗A,1+(1−wa)θ∗A,2 ,
wf =
waθ∗A,1
waθ∗A,1 + (1− wa)θ∗A,2
> wa. (21)
A symmetric argument establishes that
ws =
wa(1− θ∗A,1)
1− waθ∗A,1 − (1− wa)θ∗A,2
< wa. (22)
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Together, (21) and (22) prove that ws < wa < wf as claimed. Hence, it is
rational (and quite intuitive) that the creditors of Þrm B consider the worse
state u = u1 to be more likely when they observe that A fails. Though such
failure can be due to a low θA and not due to a high realization of u, it
provides additional information (i.e. bad news) on the true state of u. On
the other hand, conditional on a success of project A, the event u = u1 is
less likely than unconditionally.
3.3 Failure Probabilities and Contagion
What is now going to happen to the second Þrm? From the discussion in the
previous section, we know that the only difference between the creditors of
the two Þrms lies in their different assessment of the state u. The outcome
of the Þrst project serves as a signal which leads to an updated information
on the probability distribution of u. Since this signal is commonly observed,
all creditors of B share the same updated beliefs over u, and the only con-
sequence for their decision making is that the probability w is either ws or
wf . Therefore, the unique equilibrium of the game among the creditors of
B is still obtained as in section 2.2, with the important difference that the
equilibrium depends on the outcome of Þrm A. If the Þrst Þrm fails, the
two fundamental thresholds of θB can be calculated as in (11) with w = wf ,
whereas if A succeeds, the thresholds of θB are computed with w = ws.
In the following, let θfB,j (respectively θ
s
B,j) denote the thresholds of θB if
A fails (respectively succeeds), where j ∈ {1, 2} captures the state of u. The
thresholds of θB can also be written as a function θ
∗
B(u, θA), where θ
∗
B(u, θA)
is θ∗(u) computed with w = wf if θA ≤ θ∗A(u) and θ∗B(u, θA) = θ∗(u) with
w = ws if θA > θ
∗
A(u). Further, deÞne by FB and SB ≡ FB the events
where Þrm B fails respectively survives. Failure of B occurs whenever θB ≤
θ∗B(u, θA), i.e. if A fails and θB ≤ θfB,j or if A succeeds and θB ≤ θsB,j for
j ∈ {1, 2} . Formally, the two mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets FB and
SB are deÞned as:
FB = {{θA, θB, u} | θB ≤ θ∗B(u, θA)}
SB = {{θA, θB, u} | θB > θ∗B(u, θA)}
The important point to see is that the threshold of θB depends not only on
u, but also on θA, although θA is independent of any economic fundamental
which affects Þrm B.
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Since θB is uniformly distributed over the unit interval, the thresholds
of θB represent at the same time conditional failure probabilities, which are
summarized in the following equation:13
P (FB | (u = u1) ∩ FA) = θfB,1
P (FB | (u = u1) ∩ SA) = θsB,1
P (FB | (u = u2) ∩ FA) = θfB,2
P (FB | (u = u2) ∩ SA) = θsB,2.
(23)
Furthermore, the failure probability of B conditional on failure of A can be
written as
P (FB | FA) = P (FB | (u = u1) ∩ FA)P (u = u1 | FA)
+P (FB | (u = u2) ∩ FA)P (u = u2 | FA) ,
which, after plugging in the results of (19) and (23), yields the probability
P (FB | FA) =
waθ∗A,1θ
f
B,1 + (1− wa)θ∗A,2θfB,2
waθ∗A,1 + (1− wa)θ∗A,2
. (24)
Accordingly, if the creditors of the second Þrm observe that A is successful,
Þrm B fails with probability
P (FB | SA) =
wa(1− θ∗A,1)θsB,1 + (1− wa)(1− θ∗A,2)θsB,2
1− waθ∗A,1 − (1− wa)θ∗A,2
. (25)
The probabilities P (SB | FA) and P (SB | SA) of a success of Þrm B, con-
ditional on either the failure or survival of A, are calculated analogously, or
simply as 1− P (FB | FA) and 1− P (FB | SA).
Finally, we can also calculate the unconditional failure probability of each
Þrm. First, note that the likelihood of failure of A can be written as
P (FA) = P (FA | u = u1)P (u = u1) + P (FA | u = u2)P (u = u2)
Therefore, plugging in P (u = u1) = wa, P (u = u2) = 1−wa and the relevant
probabilities from (18), Þrm A fails with probability
P (FA) = w
aθ∗A,1 + (1− wa)θ∗A,2 (26)
13Naturally, the corresponding survival probabilities of Þrm B are easily found by sub-
stracting the relevant threshold from one.
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and survives with probability P (SA) = 1− P (FA). The unconditional prob-
ability of failure of the second Þrm can then be computed as
P (FB) = P (FB | FA)P (FA) + P (FB | SA)P (SA).
which, using equations (26), (24) and (25), results in
P (FB) = w
a
h
θ∗A,1θ
f
B,1 + (1− θ∗A,1)θsB,1
i
(27)
+(1− wa)
h
θ∗A,2θ
f
B,2 + (1− θ∗A,2)θsB,2
i
.
The unconditional probability that B survives, of course, is then given by
P (SB) = 1− P (FB).
To complete the discussion of this section, it is worthwhile having a closer
look at the thresholds of Þrm B conditional on the outcome of the Þrst Þrm.
From the crucial result (17) in section 2.3, we know that the threshold θ∗(u)
is increasing in w for at least one state of u. Together with wf > ws, this
implies that
θsB,1 ≤ θfB,1 (28)
and
θsB,2 ≤ θfB,2, (29)
where at least one of the inequalities (28) and (29) holds strictly. This in
turn proves that the failure of A affects the behavior of the creditors of B in
a way which increases the thresholds and thereby the likelihood of failure of
B. By the same mechanism, however, a success of A has a positive impact
on B. The following proposition summarizes these important Þndings.
Proposition 2 (Contagion) If the creditors of Þrm B observe the outcome
of Þrm A before deciding on their loan, there exists (for at least one state u)
a range of θB for which B fails if A fails and succeeds if A survives. Hence,
a failure of A increases the likelihood of failure of Þrm B, whereas a success
of Þrm A makes a failure of Þrm B less likely.
Proposition 2 is a crucial result, establishing that there is a contagious
link between the two Þrms such that the probability that B fails is higher if A
fails than conditional on a success ofA. While the Þrst part of the proposition
follows directly from the fact that at least one of the inequalities (28) and
(29) holds strictly, the second statement which concerns the likelihood of
failure may require some additional explanations, for which I refer to the
next subsection.
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3.4 Contagion and Correlation
According to proposition 2, the failure of A increases the probability that
B fails. However, this is a potentially misleading statement which deserves
closer attention. Of course, because of their joint dependence on the common
state u, the outcomes of the two Þrms are not uncorrelated even without con-
tagion, but the point I want to make is that contagion leads to an additional
increase of this natural correlation. To see this, let me sketch the following
(and hopefully not confusing) reasoning. DeÞne by eP (FB | FA) the proba-
bility that B fails conditional on the failure of A, but under the assumption
that there is no contagion. The latter assumption implies that the thresh-
olds of B are left unchanged and correspond to those of A. Accordingly, leteP (FB | SA) be the likelihood that B fails provided that A succeeds and that
there is no contagion. In other words, we might think of the probabilities
from the perspective of an outsider who can observe the outcome of A, while
the creditors of B cannot. Given these deÞnitions, I show in appendix B.1
that the following chain of inequalities holds:
P (FB | FA) > eP (FB | FA) > eP (FB | SA) > P (FB | SA). (30)
Thus, compared to the unconditional likelihood of failure, the conditional
probability that B fails is higher if A fails than if A succeeds even without
contagion. But if there is contagion, inequality (30) shows that the con-
ditional failure probability is further increased if A fails and lowered if A
succeeds. The difference between P (FB | FA) and eP (FB | FA) or betweeneP (FB | SA) and P (FB | SA) captures the effect on the failure probability
which stems from the change in the behavior of investors.
The Þrst part of the correlation which is caused by common (macroeco-
nomic) fundamentals should not be mixed up with contagion. Taking the
banking industry as an example, it may happen that several banks crash
simultaneously because they jointly face extremely bad economic conditions,
which need not mean that they have contagiously affected each other. In
my view, a reasonable understanding of Þnancial contagion can only include
forces which originate in Þnancial markets (e.g. changes in the behavior of
investors) and which remain effective even if one controls for any common
third inßuencing factors. In the present model, contagion implies that even
conditional on the state u, the likelihood that B fails is higher (lower) if A
fails (succeeds). In this sense, it is correct to conclude that by altering the
behavior of creditors, a collapse of A can cause the failure of B.
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3.5 The Model with N Þrms
So far, there are only two Þrms in the model. Before turning to a rigorous
discussion of the consequences of contagion in section 4, I would like to men-
tion that in principle, the model is easily generalized to include N ≥ 2 Þrms.
In a Þrst step, we can introduce a third Þrm C which is equivalent to A or
B, except that its investors can observe the outcome of both A and B before
having to decide on their loans. Proceeding analogously, we can include ar-
bitrarily many Þrms. The imposed time structure implies that every project
has a contagious impact on all projects which follow later in time but on
none which matures earlier. This framework raises the possibility that the
failure of one or a few Þrms can trigger a chain of failures and may even ruin
all other Þrms, which is however an extremely unlikely event. Moreover, this
is again only one side of contagion, because a single successful Þrm might
as well rescue the other Þrms. Since the basic mechanisms and insights of
the model with two Þrms remain unchanged, whereas the Bayesian updating
process becomes already involved with three Þrms, a thorough discussion of
this generalization is beyond the scope of this paper.
4 Contagion Revisited
4.1 Positive versus Negative Contagion
A major result of the model with two (or more) Þrms is that there exists
Þnancial contagion, such that the failure of Þrm A can trigger the collapse
of Þrm B. Thus, the outcome of project B depends on θA even though the
Þrm speciÞc fundamental variables θA and θB are independent. There is
also no direct connection in the sense that B is a creditor, a supplier or a
customer ofA. The contagious link between the two Þrms stems from a purely
informational mechanism, which arises because the creditors of Þrm B can
observe whether A survives or not. Based on this signal, they (reasonably)
adjust their beliefs on the state of the fundamental u, which in turn affects
the thresholds of B in such a way that project B is more likely to share the
same fate as project A. In this section, I discuss the basic mechanism and the
consequences of contagion in some more detail. The following discussion is
meant to provide a better understanding of contagion and on the conclusions
which can be drawn, since these may prove less obvious than suggested in
the existing literature.
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Given the result in proposition 2, one might take the difference between
the thresholds θfB,j and θ
s
B.j or the probabilities P (FB | FA) and P (FB | SA)
as a measure to quantify the negative impact of contagion and jump to the
conclusion that this would be the gain from eliminating contagion. However,
θsB,j and P (FB | SA) are not necessarily the appropriate benchmarks with
which θfB,j and P (FB | FA) should be compared when discussing the impact
of contagion. Rather, the outcome of the model should be compared to a
scenario in which there is no Þnancial contagion. One approach to get rid
of the contagious link is to suppose that the creditors of B cannot observe
the outcome of project A before they have to take action. Equivalently, we
could assume that two different states ua and ub are relevant in the return
function (1) of Þrm A and B, where ua and ub are independent. A third
benchmark scenario is simply to assume that Þrm B is the only present Þrm.
Each of these three scenarios provides a reasonable benchmark case in which
the relevant thresholds of Þrm B are the same as those of A.
Taking this hypothetical scenario of an autark Þrm as a starting point,
we can apply the following deÞnition of contagion: Contagion occurs when-
ever the outcome of project B deviates from the outcome which would prevail
in the benchmark case. If the second Þrm fails only because of the adverse
signal sent out by the collapse of A, the owner and the lenders of Þrm B are
apparently worse off because of A. Therefore, I deÞne this event as negative
contagion. On the other hand, there is also an event where Þrm B is suc-
cessful but would not be so in the benchmark case. At the risk of depriving
the literature on contagion of its only agreement, I deÞne this event as -
positive contagion. Since contagion is typically perceived as an undesirable
phenomenon, these deÞnitions may prove to be controversial. Those readers
who insist on contagion being a negative event per deÞnition may regard the
term negative contagion as a pleonasm, while others may Þnd the notion of
positive contagion hard to accept. Of course, this is a matter of deÞnition,
but it cannot be overemphasized that whatever name we choose for the two
phenomena, they occur by the same mechanism.
This does by no means contradict the traditional argument of the in-
formational channel that the failure of one Þrm reveals adverse information
on other Þrms. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with this explanation.
However, if we accept this argument, then the success of the very same Þrm
must also reveal some information, which must lead to an adjustment of the
players priors in the opposite direction. To see this, consider the following
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counter-example. Suppose the investors are rational and have some common
prior beliefs on an economic fundamental (here the variable u), and that
they adjust their priors in some direction conditional on bankruptcy of A.
If they adjust their priors in the same direction if A survives, the priors are
systematically adjusted in the same direction for all possible states of the
world, that is with probability one. Clearly, this is a contradiction, for no ra-
tional player could have formed such prior beliefs. Hence, the model cannot
produce the result of negative contagion without creating the possibility of
positive contagion. This should also make clear that the traditional discus-
sion, which takes only one of two directions of the propagation channel into
account, leads at best to partial insights on informational contagion.
Formally, the events Cn and Cp of positive and negative contagion can be
deÞned as:
Cn = {{θA, θB, u} | θ∗A(u) < θB ≤ θ∗B(u, θA)}
Cp = {{θA, θB, u} | θ∗B(u, θA) < θB ≤ θ∗A(u)} .
In order to get a better understanding of the notion of negative and positive
contagion, it may be illuminating to consider Þgure 3, which plots the critical
equilibrium thresholds of θA and θB for both cases u = u1 and u = u2 and
an arbitrary parameter constellation.14 While the benchmark threshold is
simply a constant θ∗A,j for j = 1, 2, the threshold θ
∗
B(u, θA) of Þrm B is a
step function with a sharp drop at θA = θ
∗
A,j for both cases u = u1 and
u = u2. Given the equilibrium strategies of the creditors, Þrm B collapses if
and only if θB ≤ θ∗B(u, θA), that is, if the joint realization of θA and θB falls
into the area under the solid step function in the relevant Þeld of Þgure 3. In
the benchmark case without contagion, by contrast, it would fail whenever
θB happened to lie below one of the dashed horizontal lines in Þgure 3.
Since negative contagion can only occur if the Þrst Þrm fails, suppose now
that A fails. Hence, Þrm B collapses when θB does not exceed θ
f
B,1 or θ
f
B,2.
As long as θB does not even exceed θ
∗
A,1 or θ
∗
A,2, however, B would also fail
in the hypothetical benchmark case. In this case, it makes no sense to speak
of contagion, because B would even fail if there were no Þrm A. Negative
contagion, therefore, is effective if and only if u = u1 and θ
∗
A,1 < θB ≤ θfB,1 or
if u = u2 and θ
∗
A,2 < θB ≤ θfB,2. In Þgure 3, negative contagion occurs in the
areas labelled I and III. On the other hand, positive contagion will be crucial
14In this example: u1=0.53, u2=0.2, z=0.2, ε=0.09, wa=0.5 and λ=0.5.
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Figure 3: Thresholds θ∗B(u, θA), θ
∗
A(u) and Contagion
for the success of Þrm B if and only if A survives and θB falls between θsB,1
and θ∗A,1 or between θ
s
B,2 and θ
∗
A,2, which is associated with regions II and IV
in Þgure 3. In this case, the fact that the investors have observed a success
of the Þrst Þrm saves the second.
Given these considerations, it is straightforward to compute the proba-
bilities associated with positive or negative contagion in terms of the funda-
mental thresholds. The results are:15
P (Cn) = w
aθ∗A,1
³
θfB,1 − θ∗A,1
´
+ (1− wa)θ∗A,2
³
θfB,2 − θ∗A,2
´
(31)
P (Cp) = w
a(1− θ∗A,1)
³
θ∗A,1 − θsB,1
´
+ (1− wa)(1− θ∗A,2)
³
θ∗A,2 − θsB,2
´
(32)
The natural question which arises next is whether positive or negative con-
tagion is more likely to occur. As will be shown below, the answer to this
question is surprisingly (or may be not so surprisingly) simple.
4.2 The Net Effect of Contagion
In order to capture the net effect of contagion, we have to deÞne a rea-
sonable measure of this impact. Since the model allows to calculate the
15The probabilities are derived in appendix B.2.
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likelihood of positive or negative contagion, an obvious approach to deÞne
a net measure of contagion is to compare the probabilities of positive and
negative contagion. More speciÞcally, I deÞne the net effect of contagion
(NEC) by
NEC = P (Cp)− P (Cn). (33)
This measure is restricted to the intervall [−1, 1] and is positive if and only if
positive contagion is more frequent. Alternatively, by comparing the proba-
bility of failure in the presence of contagion to the benchmark case, the above
deÞned net effect of contagion can be computed as
NEC = P (FA)− P (FB)
or as P (SB) − P (SA). Naturally, the two deÞnitions of the net effect must
yield the same result. Given the Þrst deÞnition above and equations (31) and
(32), the net effect in terms of the fundamental thresholds turns out to be :
NEC = wa
h
θ∗A,1(1− θfB,1)− (1− θ∗A,1)θsB,1
i
(34)
+(1− wa)
h
θ∗A,2(1− θfB,2)− (1− θ∗A,2)θsB,2
i
.
This, however, is not the end of the story, for the magnitude of the net
effect is much simpler than the above term may suggest. If we plug in the
appropriate thresholds, the result simpliÞes to
NEC = 0.
Hence, whatever the likelihood of positive or negative contagion is, the net
effect of contagion deÞned in (33) is exactly zero, as stated in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 In the uniform model, the events of negative and positive
contagion are equally likely. Therefore, the net effect of contagion is zero.
In order to understand the meaning of the proposition, we may also con-
sider an investor who can choose whether to buy equity claims of Þrm A or
B which yield a constant dividend in case of success and nothing otherwise.
Both Þrms are identical except that B is subject to contagion while A is
not. Proposition 3 then tells us that before the game starts, this investor
is indifferent between both choices. In other words, the present framework
suggests that if we are only interested in whether the Þrm fails or not, there
is no need to care about contagion.16 As a matter of course, this Þnding
16Notice that there are indeed no other states of the Þrm in this model: either the return
is R or 0.
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contrasts sharply with the widespread concern about contagion both among
academics and politicians.
The proposition can be proved by simply computing the term in (34) with
the thresholds given by (11), where w has to be replaced appropriately by
either wa, wf or ws. Notice that although this is in principle straightforward,
the thresholds are computed differently for different ranges of λ as discussed
in section 2.3, and in combination with a second Þrm there are already quite
many cases to look at.17
4.3 Some further Remarks on Contagion
4.3.1 Incidence of Contagion
Besides identifying the net effect of contagion, one might also be inter-
ested in a measure of the frequency or incidence of contagion. Such a mea-
sure, denoted IC, can be obtained by summing up the probabilities of pos-
itive and negative contagion, where due to proposition 3 IC = 2P (Cn) =
2P (Cp). Plugging in the appropriate thresholds from (11) into equation (31)
or (32) and simplifying the resulting expression yields the following result in
terms of the model parameters:18
IC =

2λzwa((1−wa)(u1−u2)−λz)
(1−wa) if 0 < λ < λ
4εzwa(1−wa)(u1−u2)2
(2ε+z)2
if λ ≤ λ ≤ λ
2z(1−wa)(1−λ)(wa(u1−u2)−z(1−λ))
wa
if λ > λ
(35)
This measure shows how frequently the outcome of the Þrst Þrm is decisive
for the outcome of the second Þrm. Notice that while the effect of λ, wa and
z is ambiguous, the incidence of contagion is increasing in u1 and decreasing
in u2. Clearly, the larger the difference between the two possible realizations
of u is, the more important is the updated information which the creditors
of B can gain from observing the outcome of A. This Þnding leads us to a
more general discussion of the role of the fundamental state u.
17The computations of the net effect are available from the author on request.
18λ and λ are deÞned in equation (12) in section 2.3.
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4.3.2 The Role of the Common Fundamental and of Rationality
An evident but nevertheless important insight of the preceding analysis is
that with rational agents, informational contagion can only occur if there
exist some common factors inßuencing both considered Þrms or countries. If
none of the fundamentals affecting the Þrms are correlated, the failure of the
Þrst Þrm does not reveal any information that is relevant for the creditors of
the second Þrm. Hence, they have no reason to condition their strategies on
the outcome of the Þrst Þrm and there can be no contagion. Moreover, to
understand the role of the common state u, we could also consider the case
where the common fundamental is negatively correlated, although this case
is certainly less realistic in practice. Instead of assuming that the state u is
the same for both Þrms, suppose now that the success of Þrm A (B) depends
on the state uA (uB), where uB = u1 if uA = u2 and uB = u2 if uA = u1. In
this case, leaving all other assumptions unchanged, the model would result in
a peculiar kind of contagion which one might call anti-contagion, because
the failure of A would lower the chances of a failure of B.
Thus, the sign of the correlation of the common fundamental u determines
the sign of contagion. But while the dependence on some common economic
fundamentals is an important prerequisite, it is not sufficient for observing
contagious events, because Þrms with sufficiently strong Þrm-speciÞc funda-
mentals θ will withstand negative contagion. Very weak Þrms, on the other
hand, cannot be rescued by positive contagion.
Finally, notice that a second prerequisite for having an informational
channel of contagion is the rationality of agents. In contrast to the popular
view that contagion must be driven by some weird and irrational animal
spirits, the present model underlines that it is exactly the rational reasoning
of the creditors which leads to a systematic contagious link between the Þrms.
4.3.3 Empirical Evidence
The preceding subsection has established some features of the model which
are different from pure sunspot theories and which have empirically testable
implications. First, Þrms can only suffer (or beneÞt!) from informational
contagion if they are in some sense perceived to be similar, that is, if agents
think they are equally affected by some common fundamental(s). This issue
has been explored by Aharony and Swary (1996) in the context of bank
failures. In their study on 33 US banks in the mid-1980s, they Þnd that
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the extent of the negative impact of contagion is greater for banks that
are similar to the failed bank.19 Likewise, Ahluwalia (2000) shows for a
sample of 19 emerging countries and three episodes of crises that a countrys
vulnerability to contagious currency crises depends on the visible similarities
between that country and other countries experiencing a crisis.20 This is,
again, exactly what the model predicts: After a crisis in one country, investors
tend to withdraw their funds from different countries if the latter seem to
have something in common with the Þrst country. Second, in contrast to pure
sunspot models, informational contagion cannot randomly ruin (or save) any
Þrm or country. Even in the presence of contagion, the Þrms which survive
are invariably those with the stronger Þrm speciÞc fundamentals. Again,
most empirical studies on contagion clearly support this implication.21
4.3.4 Transparency and Contagion
An important issue in the current discussion about strengthening the in-
ternational Þnancial system is the call for increased transparency. Morris
and Shin (1999), however, show that in a global game framework, increas-
ing transparency, interpreted as raising the precision of the private signals,
need not mitigate the inefficiency of the coordination failure. To see why
this is true in the present model, notice that by equation (15) in section 2.3,
a decreasing ε need not lower the failure thresholds. What are the conse-
quences for contagion if ε → 0? From equation (35), it is easily seen that
the likelihood of contagion does not depend on ε whenever λ < λ or λ > λ.
Therefore, if ε→ 0, the incidence of contagion converges to zero if and only
if λ ≤ λ ≤ λ, and before becoming too enthusiastic, one should bear in
mind that the inefficiency of the coordination failure has nothing to do with
contagion and is not eliminated even in this case.
19See also Gorton (1988), who Þnds that bank failures are related to the (of course,
common) business cycle.
20See also Park and Song (2000), who argue in their empirical study that foreign bank
creditors refused to roll over short term debt in Korea after the crisis in Thailand of 1997,
apparently because of a perceived similarity. Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) also
Þnd a role of macroeconomic similarity, although in their study, it seems to be dominated
by trade links.
21According to Saunders and Wilson (1996), for example, poor banks faced more with-
drawals than sound banks during the US banking panics between 1929-1933. Calomiris
and Mason (1997) Þnd that despite some confusion, it were the weaker banks that Þnally
failed in the Chicago Bank Panic of 1932.
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4.3.5 Diversification and Contagion
Another implication of the analysis is that contagion limits the beneÞts of
portfolio diversiÞcation, since it increases the correlation between the returns
of the two Þrms. From the perspective of our creditors in the model, this is
not a problem. Being risk neutral, they would not be eager to diversify even if
they had the opportunity to do so. If, on the other hand, we think of investors
who hold equity claims that yield a constant dividend if the Þrm survives and
nothing otherwise, then these investors would prefer a world without Þnancial
contagion. Contagion implies that the undiversÞable risk is higher than it
appears if only takes the impact of the fundamentals into account. This is
an implication which is also emphasized by Goldstein and Pauzner (2001).
In their model, there would be no correlation between returns in different
countries without contagion. Their endogenous correlation arises because
the two countries share the same investors, while in the present model, the
Þrms face different investors, but the behavior of the creditors of the second
Þrm increases the natural correlation between the Þrms.
4.3.6 When Should we Care about Systemic Risk?
The presentation thus far suggests that there are little if any adverse conse-
quences of contagion, apart from the implications on diversiÞcation. Before
turning to the concluding summary of the paper, let me therefore take up
the important question if there is any reason to be concerned about conta-
gion or systemic risk. While the present model cannot not come up with a
deÞnitive answer to that question, it helps to clarify where the problems of
systemic risk are to be looked for and where not. It may be helpful, for this
purpose, to highlight again the difference between a world with and without
contagion. If one neglects the uncountable possible outcomes for each sin-
gle creditor, there are only three distinguishable states of the world in the
model with 2 Þrms: either no Þrm fails, one of the Þrms fails, or both fail.
The consequence of contagion is that the states in which no or both Þrms
fails become more likely, whereas the failure of a single Þrm is less probable.
But due to the symmetry result of proposition 3, failures are not more fre-
quent if there is contagion. Hence, the problem of systemic risk is not that
a failure of a single member of the system can trigger the failure of other
members, because this is compensated for. One should also bear in mind
that the inefficiency of the equilibrium thresholds, which has been discussed
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in section 2.3, is a consequence of the coordination failure and has nothing
to do with systemic risk. This makes clear that one should be concerned
about systemic risk if and only if there exist some additional costs of a joint
failure of both (respectively many) Þrms, that is, if the joint failure of two
Þrms is considered to be worse than twice the failure of a single Þrm. One
might argue, for example, that the functioning of some system is endangered
or that some know-how is forever lost if too many Þrms fail together. While
I leave it open for future research whether there really exist such additional
systemic effects, there are no such costs in the present model.
5 Conclusions
Extending a global game model in the manner of Morris and Shin (1999)
to include two fundamentals and two or more Þrms has produced four main
results. First, the unique equilibrium result of the basic model with only
one fundamental and one Þrm still holds, and second, the Þrst Þrm has
a contagious impact on the performance of the second or any further Þrm
merely by affecting the beliefs of the creditors. Unlike any multiple equilibria
model in the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the present model is
able to determine exactly in which states of economic fundamentals contagion
occurs. Beyond the theoretical satisfaction of obtaining a unique equilibrium
and more importantly, such a model provides a rigorous framework to analyze
contagion and reveals some hitherto unnoticed insights. In particular, from
a neutral perspective, there exists also positive contagion in the sense that a
good performance of one Þrm can rescue other Þrms. This is a third crucial
result, or rather an important insight, which stems from comparing contagion
with a well deÞned and natural benchmark in which there is no contagion.
While the present model can also explain that a collapsing Þrm can trigger
a chain of failures, it makes clear that this is only one side of contagion.
The occurrence of positive contagion is not a marginal peculiarity of the
model, it is as natural as negative contagion and happens exactly by the same
mechanism. To my knowledge, this Þnding is new to the literature, which
centers around negative contagion so far. Finally, a fourth major result of
the paper shows that in the model with uniformly distributed fundamentals,
negative and positive contagion are equally likely to occur, implying that the
net effect of contagion on the Þrms is exactly zero.
In contrast to the contributions of Dasgupta (2001) and Goldstein and
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Pauzner (2001), who also use the unique equilibrium selection technique of
Carlsson and van Damme (1993) to explore contagion, the present model fo-
cuses on purely informational contagion. There are neither capital links nor
wealth effects at work. As should be intuitively evident, a closer analysis of
the transmission channel makes clear that there can be no informational con-
tagion if none of the relevant economic fundamentals affecting the Þrms are
correlated. This is also consistent with the empirical literature on banking
and international Þnancial crises, which Þnds ample evidence that conta-
gion does not arbitrarily spread to any Þrm or country. Rather, similarities
between Þrms or countries help to predict contagion. Another implication
which distinguishes the present informational model from pure sunspot the-
ories is that even with contagion, the failing Þrms are invariably those with
weaker fundamentals. This Þnding is again conÞrmed by the bulk of em-
pirical studies on contagion, which Þnd that investors can at least to some
extent discriminate between weak and strong Þrms (or countries). Further,
the model implies that contagion does not necessarily vanish if the investors
signals become arbitrarily precise. Therefore, creating transparency need not
eliminate contagion. This is, on the other hand, again no reason for tremen-
dous concern since the consequences of contagion are not as weird as usually
suggested.
Is there any reason for policy intervention in an industry in which there
is informational contagion? From the discussion above, it is clear that any
benevolent regulator should try to eliminate negative contagion while pre-
serving the possibility of positive contagion, which is a tricky task, to say
the least, for both possibilities are caused by the same mechanism. Since the
net effect of contagion is zero, the model suggests that informational conta-
gion provides no sound background to justify any intervention. Nevertheless,
the equilibrium outcome of the model is inefficient, for both projects fail in
some states where they would survive if the creditors were able to coordinate.
Thus, there is a potential for improvement, provided some regulator is able
to eliminate the coordination failure. This inefficiency, however, does not
result from contagion, but is a consequence of the coordination failure itself.
Informational Þnancial contagion neither adds nor removes any inefficiency.
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Appendix
1 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof of lemma 2 presented here is taken from Morris and Shin (1998)
except that some intermediate steps work just other way round. Let π(si)
denote the fraction of creditors who roll over the loan when receiving signal
si and let Q(si, π) be the expected payoff conditional on strategy π and on
observing the signal si. Then the proof will proceed in the following two
steps:
1. π(si) ≥ π0(si) ∀si implies Q(si, π) ≥ Q(si, π0) ∀si.
2. Together with lemma 1, this implies that Is∗(si) is the unique equilib-
rium strategy.
For the Þrst result, note that conditional on θ and π, the fraction of
creditors foreclosing on the loan is
l(θ, π) =
Z θ+ε
θ−ε
[1− π(si)] dsi. (36)
Next, denote by
S(π) = {{u, θ} | θ > u+ zl(θ, π)}
the event in which the project is a success given aggregate strategy π. Because
of the discrete nature of u, the set S(π) of all {u, θ} combinations for which
the Þrm survives can be split up in to the two mutually exclusive events
S(π) = {u = u1, θ ∈ S1(π)} ∪ {u = u2, θ ∈ S2(π)} (37)
where
S1(π) = {θ | θ > u1 + zl(θ,π)} (38)
and
S2(π) = {θ | θ > u2 + zl(θ,π)} . (39)
The expected payment Q(si, π) is then simply the probability of a success
conditional on π and si, i.e. P (S(π) | si). Given (37) and the conditional
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distribution θ | si in (5), and noticing that the posterior probability of u
being u1 is w (and that θ and u are independent), the expected payoff is
Q(si, π) = w
Z
S1(π)∩[si−ε,si+ε]
(2ε)−1dθ + [1− w]
Z
S(π)∩[si−ε,si+ε]
(2ε)−1dθ. (40)
Now the argument can be stated as follows. If π(si) ≥ π0(si) ∀si, then by
(36) l(θ, π) ≤ l(θ,π0) for all θ and by (38) and (39) S1(π) ⊇ S1(π0) and
S2(π) ⊇ S2(π0). Thus, from (40) follows Q(si, π) ≥ Q(si,π0) as claimed.
Hence, the decisions to roll over the loan are strategic complements, that is,
the decision of some players to prolong credit makes it more attractive for
other players to do so for any state of the fundamental.22
Turning to the second step of the proof, consider the strategy π(si) in
any equilibrium of the game among creditors and deÞne s∼ and
∼
s as
s∼ = inf {si | π(si) > 0}
∼
s = sup {si | π(si) < 1} .
Then, s∼ ≤ inf {s | 0 < π(si) < 1} ≤ sup {s | 0 < π(si) < 1} ≤
∼
s implies
s∼ ≤
∼
s . (41)
Note that whenever π(si) < 1, some creditors end up foreclosing on the loan,
which is only consistent with equilibrium behavior when the expected payoff
Q(si, π) does not exceed λ. By continuity, this must also hold for si = es:
Q(
∼
s, π) ≤ λ. (42)
Since I∼
s
(
∼
s) ≤ π(∼s) and because of the result derived in the Þrst step above,
(42) implies
Q(
∼
s, I∼
s
) ≤ λ. (43)
22Games which exhibit strategic complementarities are known as supermodular games.
In global games with strategic complementarities, there exist a smallest and largest strategy
that survive iterated deletion of dominated strategies and which coincide in the limit as
the signal error vanishes. In the present model with uniform distributions, there is even
no need to let the signal error shrink to zero in order to obtain a unique equilibrium. See
Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2002) for a general theoretical discussion of global games
with strategic complementarities.
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Next, we know from lemma 1 that
∼
s= s∗ is the unique solution to Q(
∼
s, I∼
s
) =
λ, which implies
Q(
∼
s, I∼
s
) ≤ Q(s∗, Is∗), (44)
Further, in the proof of lemma 1 it has been shown that Q(
∼
s, I∼
s
) is increasing
in
∼
s, which, together with (44), establishes
∼
s≤ s∗. (45)
A symmetric argument shows that
s∼≥ s
∗. (46)
Now, together with (41), the above inequalities (45) and (46) imply s∗ ≤ s∼
≤ ∼s≤ s∗ and therefore
s∼=
∼
s= s∗. (47)
In an equilibrium strategy π, the greatest lower bound of the set of si in
which at least one creditor rolls over coincides with the least upper bound
of the set in which at least one creditor terminates the loan. This means if
at least one lender rolls over her loan, everyone does so, or put differently,
π(si) is either 0 or 1, and the switching point is si = s∗. Hence, the unique
strategy which is consistent with equilibrium is switching around s∗. This
proves lemma 2.
2 Probabilities of Contagion
2.1 Proof of Inequality (30)
The Þrst inequality
P (FB | FA) = wfθfB,1 + (1− wf)θfB,2 > wfθ∗A,1 + (1− wf)θ∗A,2 = eP (FB | FA)
in (30) follows from θfB,j ≥ θ∗A,j, which holds strictly at least for one j = 1, 2.
Then
eP (FB | FA) = wfθ∗A,1 + (1− wf)θ∗A,2 > waθ∗A,1 + (1− wa)θ∗A,2 = P (FA)
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follows because wf > wa and θ∗A,1 > θ
∗
A,2. Next, w
s < wa and θ∗A,1 > θ
∗
A,2
together imply
P (FA) = w
aθ∗A,1 + (1− wa)θ∗A,2 > wsθ∗A,1 + (1− ws)θ∗A,2 = eP (FB | SA),
establishing eP (FB | FA) > eP (FB | SA). Finally,
eP (FB | SA) = wsθ∗A,1 + (1− ws)θ∗A,2 > wsθsB,1 + (1− ws)θsB,2 = P (FB | SA)
results from θsj ≤ θaj , holding again strictly for a least one j = 1, 2. This
proves the claim (30).
2.2 Likelihood of negative and positive Contagion
The probability of negative contagion is
P (Cn) = P
³
(u = u1) ∩ FA ∩ (θ∗A,1 < θB ≤ θfB,1)
´
+P
³
(u = u2) ∩ FA ∩ (θ∗A,2 < θB ≤ θfB,2)
´
.
Noticing that θB is independent of u and does not affect the outcome of A,
the above probability can be expressed as
P (Cn) = P
³
θ∗A,1 < θB ≤ θfB,1
´
P (FA | u = u1)P (u = u1)
+P
³
θ∗A,2 < θB ≤ θfB,2
´
P (FA | u = u2)P (u = u2) .
Accordingly, the likelihood of positive contagion is given by
P (Cp) = P
³
θsB,1 < θB ≤ θ∗A,1
´
P (SA | u = u1)P (u = u1)
+P
³
θsB,2 < θB ≤ θ∗A,2
´
P (SA | u = u2)P (u = u2) .
Plugging in (18), (26) and P (u = u1) = wa yields, after some algebra, the
probabilities given in equations (31) and (32).
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